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Working Paper

THE CURIOUS CASE OF COMPETITION AND QUALITY
Ariel Ezrachi* & Maurice E. Stucke**
I. INTRODUCTION
A central mantra of competition policy is that competitive market forces,
besides lowering prices, can increase efficiency, product quality, the level
of services, the number of choices, and ultimately consumers’ welfare.
Indeed, the antitrust community generally accepts a relationship between
greater competition and lower prices and uses the latter as the prime metric
in assessing competitive behavior and the effects on consumer welfare.
Alongside the consideration of price, competition authorities recognize that
quality can be as, if not more, important in some markets.
But as competition authorities also recognize, identifying the
dimensions of competition important to many consumers is difficult. Even
when these dimensions of quality are identified, measuring them represents
additional challenges.
To circumvent these challenges, competition authorities rely on several
heuristics when assessing a merger’s, cartel’s or monopolistic restraint’s
impact on quality. One heuristic is that more competition will generally
increase quality for a given price or reduce price for a given level of quality.
A second heuristic is that when prices and quality vary, consumers will
weigh the offerings using an internal price-quality metric. Price adjusts for
quality, and consumers rely on the heuristic “you get what you pay for.”
Often the heuristics work well for the competition authorities.
However, at times, market realities are more complex and these
heuristics fail to reflect the relationship between competition and quality.
In this paper we focus on these instances in which the positive correlation
*

Slaughter and May Professor of Competition Law, The University of Oxford. Director,
Oxford University Centre for Competition Law and Policy.
**
Associate Professor, University of Tennessee College of Law; Senior Fellow, American
Antitrust Institute.
The authors would like to thank, for their helpful comments, participants of the 2014
Loyola–Haifa Competition Workshop and participants of CCP 10th Annual Conference.

Electroniccopy
copy available
available at:
Electronic
at:https://ssrn.com/abstract=2494656
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2494656

2

COMPETITION & QUALITY

between competition and quality breaks down. We explore two necessary,
but not sufficient, variables, which affect that correlation. The first relates to
the consumers’ limited ability to accurately assess quality differences. The
second concerns imperfect information flows that make it difficult or costly
to convey to consumers the products’ or services’ inherent quality
differences. Companies recognize that neither they nor their competitors can
easily or inexpensively convey to consumers the inherent quality
differences in their and   their   competitors’ product offerings. With these
variables in mind, we consider instances when an increase in competition
will not increase quality (when one would expect it should) and when
competition is inversely correlated with quality, and its increase would lead
to quality degradation.
Importantly, we do not posit a normative argument: namely that
consumers are choosing poor quality goods and services (e.g., reality
television shows) when they should be demanding higher quality fare (e.g.,
investigative news programs). Nor do we posit a social welfare argument,
namely competition involving status goods (where price may correlate more
with conspicuous consumption than quality), which increases envy to the
detriment of overall well-being. Our assumption is that while different
customers have different desires and seek a range of quality, many
customers for certain goods and services desire a similar specific dimension
of quality. Our focus is on the ability of the competitive process to deliver
that desired quality attribute.
I. The Significance, yet Illusive Nature of Quality
Quality forms a fundamental aspect of competition. Competition
agencies acknowledge that it is a   “key non-price consideration that
determines whether consumers will purchase a product.”1 That significance
was echoed by competition agencies that took part in the Organisation for
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)’s 2013 roundtable on
the role and measurement of quality. Participating jurisdictions agreed that
quality drives innovation and economic growth and that a decrease in
1

Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, The Role and Measurement
of Quality in Competition Analysis 5 (Oct. 28, 2013) (Executive Summary), available at
http://www.oecd.org/competition/Quality-in-competition-analysis-2013.pdf
[hereinafter
OECD Quality Report].
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quality can be as harmful to consumers (if not more harmful given health
and safety concerns) as a price increase.2 Subsequently, maintaining and
improving quality forms an important objective for competition policy.3
While important, quality forms a somewhat elusive target for
competition agencies. Since quality is often multidimensional with both
objective and subjective components,4 it can be a relative concept: what one
person’s desires another can dismiss or revile.
Identifying quality is therefore challenging. One metric is to divide
quality components along vertical (where all consumers recognize that
component as valuable) and horizontal (where consumers disagree over the
component’s desirability or value) dimensions.5 This too is inexact.
Consumers may have different rankings of the vertical components (such as
some preferring faster food delivery over perhaps taste). Thus, a “single
exhaustive definition of quality is a challenging endeavor.”6
Another problem concerns measuring the highly ranked vertical quality
dimensions. Whereas price comparison (absent price shrouding) provides a
transparent and consistent benchmark, quality assessment can be complex
and subjective.7 At times, competition authorities can see how market
participants   “define,   measure,   and   assess   quality   in   the   ordinary   course   of  
business”   or   see   whether   the   academic   and   popular   economics   “reveal  

2

OECD Quality Report, supra note, at 5 (Executive Summary).
OECD Quality Report, supra note,  at  43  (Australia),  77  &  83  (“The  Horizontal  Merger  
Guidelines expressly state that one of the effects to be analysed in merger control is the
effect on quality, putting the competitive harm caused by a reduction of quality on an equal
footing with an increase of prices, or a reduction of output, choice of goods and  services.”)  
(European Union), 89 (Japan).
4
Quality encompasses our senses of taste, smell (perfume or a pungent flower), touch
(such as soft leather), sound (the acoustics of a recording), and visual aesthetic appeal. It
encompasses “durability, reliability, location, [and] design.” OECD Quality Report, supra
note, at 6 (Executive Summary).
5
OECD Quality Report, supra note, at 6 (Executive Summary), 43 (Australia).
6
OECD Quality Report, supra note, at 6 (Executive Summary).
7
See, e.g., OECD Quality Report, supra note, at 78 (European Union) (“Making  a  precise
definition of quality for a given product is a complex task in competition investigations
given the many subjective features that may contribute to a perception of quality by
customers, the multi-dimensional nature of quality, and the absence of measurable
variables.”).
3
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useful  measures  of  quality.”8 But for many products, quality attributes may
be difficult to measure objectively.9 As the European Commission noted:
[E]ven if some quality-related features are measurable, the overall
perception of the products’ quality is often based on a combination of
several features. If one were to take cars as an example, the number of
measurable variables at which customers may look when assessing the
quality is immense and very complex, ranging from speed, acceleration,
emissions, consumption to precise parameters of the individual
components. The assessment of quality is thus often a complex and
imprecise exercise in itself, and involves the balancing of evidence
which is often of subjective nature such as different perception of
10
customers.

Identifying the highly ranked vertical dimensions of quality is inherently
difficult. Even when many consumers rank a quality attribute highly along
a vertical dimension, objectively assessing and measuring quality can be
challenging and often imprecise. Thus, competition authorities typically
avoid assessing for differentiated goods and services the impact that a
restraint has on quality.11 Nor do they typically assess consumers’ response
to a small but significant non-transitory decrease in product quality (a
“SSNDQ”  test).12 The enforcement challenge of accurately identifying and
8

OECD Quality Report, supra note, at 121 (US).
OECD Quality Report, supra note, at 121 (US); see also id. at 60 (Canada) (noting how
“the   components   of   product   quality   may   be   difficult   to   observe   or   measure   in   certain  
cases”);;   Kurt R. Brekke et al., Price and Quality in Spatial Competition, 40 REGIONAL
SCIENCE & URBAN ECON. 471 (2010). Illustrative in this respect is the European
Commission’s decision in Intel where the Commission noted the challenge and subjectivity
involved in assessing the quality of high-tech products. Indeed, the Commission
acknowledged the lack of a single parameter that defines the quality of a product, in
particular when the product in question is complex. COMP/37.990 Intel Corporation OJ
(2009) C 227/07 at [909] 1691.
10
OECD Quality Report, supra note, at 79 (European Union); see also id. at 60 (Canada)
(noting   that   “even   when   a   component   of   product   quality   is   quantifiable,   consumers   may  
have varied tastes, and may not agree as to what features of a product constitute better or
worse  quality”).
11
Thus few competition authorities, the OECD found, “have developed an effective
means” by which to systematically identify the vertical dimensions of quality and
objectively measure how a restraint would affect these quality dimensions OECD Quality
Report, supra note, at 5 (Executive Summary).
12
OECD Quality Report, supra note, at 9 (noting that SSNDQ test “in practice . . . is
unworkable” given “the inherent difficulties of measuring quality alongside the existing
complications of the applying the SSNIP test itself within real market situations”)  and  164  
9
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measuring quality has led competition agencies to rely on two basic
heuristics.
One  heuristic  is  that  “[m]ore  competition  will  generally  increase  quality
for   a   given   price   or   reduce   price   for   a   given   level   of   quality.”13 The
Mexican competition authority, for example, noted:
Starting from less than perfect competition, more competition generally
implies higher quality. Under strong competition, prices, quantities,
quality, variety, costs, and innovation should be at their efficient levels,
reflecting efficient tradeoffs. Market failure or a non-competitive market
structure may imply that those parameters are not necessarily at their
efficient levels. The strategic variables, and the ways firms react to each
other in the industry will have an important effect on the observed
market outcomes.14

This correlation suggests that a restraint, in substantially lessening
competition, would cause quality to deviate below the levels that consumers
would otherwise prefer. On that point, the US competition authorities
observed   how   “[i]t   has long been recognized under U.S. antitrust law that
quality is among the attributes of a product or service that typically benefits
from   competition”   and   how   the   “Sherman   Act   reflects   a   legislative  
judgment that ultimately competition will produce not only lower prices,
but  also  better  goods  and  services.”15

(EU delegate expressing  “the view that it would be rather challenging to replace the SSNIP
test with a SSNDQ test, insofar as the latter relies heavily on market data that is inherently
difficult to measure”).
13
OECD Quality Report, supra note, at 97 (Mexico); see also id. at 44 (Australia) (“Given  
the  potential  for  competition  to  generate  improvements  in  quality,”  observed  the  Australian  
competition  authority,  “consideration  should  therefore  be  given  to  policy  options  that  can  
enhance competition and ensure the efficient and optimal level of quality is supplied by a
market.”); US Department of Justice, Antitrust Division, Antitrust Enforcement and the
Consumer (2005), http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/div_stats/antitrust-enfor-consumer.pdf
(“Free   and   open   competition   benefits   consumers   by   ensuring lower prices and new and
better products. In a freely competitive market, each competing business generally will try
to attract consumers by cutting its prices and increasing the quality of its products or
services. Competition and the profit opportunities it brings also stimulate businesses to find
new,  innovative,  and  more  efficient  methods  of  production.”).
14
OECD Quality Report, supra note, at 97 (Mexico).
15
OECD Quality Report, supra note, at 119 (United States) (quoting National Society of
Professional Engineers v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 695 (1978)).
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A second rule of thumb is to assume that when prices and quality vary,
consumers will weigh the offerings using an internal price-quality metric.16
Some consumers, for example, will weigh the price savings greater than the
incremental quality gain—for example, the traveler willing to sacrifice the
better quality food and service of first class travel for a cheaper airplane
ticket.
While competition agencies may find it difficult to accurately identify
and objectively measure widespread quality dimensions, they are well
positioned to safeguard quality from being undermined, by relying on these
two rules of thumb.
Accordingly, in many markets the agencies assume a positive
correlation between competition and quality and   a   customer’s   ability   to  
appraise quality. As the competitive pressure increases, agents are
motivated, among other things, to enhance the quality of their products or
service. On the other hand, reduced competitive pressure is likely to reduce
product quality. To illustrate, note for example, BAA v Competition
Commission where anemic competition was held to primarily harm quality
of service rather than price.17 In that case the U.K.’s   Competition
Commission ordered the sale of an airport to stimulate service quality
competition between airport operators in the London area.18
In the same vein, a reduction in competition via the increase in market
power is often assumed to reduce quality. Indeed, in the area of merger
control the US and EU competition authorities in their policy statements
recognize that an increase in market power can yield higher prices and
lower quality.19 Consistent with the policy announcements, recent
16

Where prices are both regulated and above marginal cost, another rule of thumb is that
quality competition among firms increases. OECD Quality Report, supra note, at 7
(Executive Summary). The classic example is when airfares in the US were regulated, and
flying was an enjoyable experience, with better food, more legroom, friendlier service, and
overall a more enjoyable experience than flying in coach today on any legacy US airline.
17
BAA v Competition Commission [2012] CAT 3. The Competition Commission and
Competition Appeals Tribunal make similar points in their 2009 case: BAA v Competition
Commission v Ryanair [2009] CAT 35.
18
Decision upheld on appeal. BAA v Competition Commission [2012] CAT 3; [2012]
EWCA Civ 1077 point 35.
19
US Dep’t of Justice & Fed. Trade Comm’n, Horizontal Merger Guidelines § 1 (Aug. 19,
2010),
http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/attachments/merger-review/100819hmg.pdf
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enforcement activity involving mergers recognized the importance of
quality.20 The competition authorities often focus on price competition, but
occasionally analyze whether the merger may reduce quality.21 But even
here, the competition authorities, when analyzing whether a merger may
substantially lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly, focus on the
merger’s likely effect on prices in the short-term. In effect the agency
applies the heuristic that the merger, in decreasing competition, will likely
raise price and reduce the quality levels.
This heuristic, however, fails when the product or service has been
traditionally offered for free, and many consumers are unwilling to pay for
it. When the competition authority evaluates these free goods and services
(often in two-sided markets), quality is typically the most important
dimension of competition for consumers.22 One example is the free instant
messaging, and voice and video calls that consumers use on their tablets,
(“[e]nhanced market power can also be manifested in non-price terms and conditions that
adversely affect customers, including reduced product quality, reduced product variety,
reduced service, or diminished innovation. Such non-price effects may coexist with price
effects, or can arise in their absence. When the Agencies investigate whether a merger may
lead to a substantial lessening of non-price competition, they employ an approach
analogous to that used to evaluate price competition.”); EC Guidelines on the Assessment
of Horizontal Mergers under the Council Regulation on the control of concentrations
between undertakings, 2004/C 31/03, § 8 (likewise recognizing the importance of quality,
noting  that  “[e]ffective  competition  brings  benefits  to  consumers,  such  as  low  prices, high
quality  products,  a   wide   selection  of  goods  and  services,  and  innovation,”  and  how   firms  
can exercise market power by, among other things, “reducing the choice or quality of
goods and services”).
20
Plaintiff’s  Post-Trial Proposed Findings of Fact, United States v. Bazaarvoice, Inc., Case
No. 3:13-cv-00133-WHO, ¶¶ 198-216 (N.D. Cal. filed Oct. 31, 2013) (discussing how
transaction will reduce innovation and product variety); Second Amended Complaint,
United States v. AT&T, Inc., No 1:11-cv-01560-ESH, ¶ 3 (D.D.C. Sept. 30, 2011) (alleging
that  unless  the  acquisition  is  enjoined,  “customers  of  mobile  wireless  telecommunications  
services likely will face higher prices, less product variety and innovation, and poorer
quality services due to reduced incentives  to  invest  than  would  exist  absent  the  merger”).
21
OECD Quality Report, supra note, at 83 (European Union). For example, in the
prohibition decision relating to the proposed takeover of Aer Lingus by the Irish low-cost
carrier Ryanair in 2007, a reduction of service quality was one of the elements in the
Commission’s  theory of harm. The Commission found that post-merger, Ryanair would not
only have the ability to increase price, but that it could keep the current price levels and
degrade quality of Aer Lingus’ services, meaning that the price/quality ratio would be
worsened for consumers. The two parameters – quality and price – were inherently linked.
22
European Commission Case No. Comp/M. 6281—Microsoft/Skype, Regulation (EC) No.
139/2004 Merger Procedure (Oct. 7, 2011); European Commission Case No. Comp/M.
5727—Microsoft/Yahoo! Search Business Regulation (EC) No. 139/2004 Merger
Procedure (Feb. 18, 2010).
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computers or smartphones.23 Since the products are mainly offered for free,
the European Commission found,   consumers   “pay   more   attention   to   other  
features”  and  quality  “is  therefore  a  significant  parameter  of  competition.”24
But even here the competition authorities infrequently seek to identify
specific quality dimensions, assess the consumer response to a small but
significant non-transitory decrease in quality (a SSNDQ) and measure how
the merger will likely impact this dimension of quality. 25 Typically the
authority--when assessing the merging  parties’  incentives to degrade quality
for the free product--assume that consumers could detect the degradation in
quality and would want to switch to rival products or services.26
That rationale is also evident when the competition authority analyzes
exclusionary and predatory practices by a dominant undertaking. The
competition authorities recognize that monopolies’ exclusionary behavior
can adversely affect quality levels.27 One example is the Commission’s
Guidance Paper on the Application of Article 102 of the Treaty on the
Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) to exclusionary abuse: in
applying  Article  102  TFEU  “the Commission will focus on those types of
conduct that are most harmful to consumers. Consumers benefit from
competition through lower prices, better quality and a wider choice of new
or improved goods and services. The Commission, therefore, will direct its
enforcement to ensuring that markets function properly and that consumers
benefit from the efficiency and productivity which result from effective

23

Microsoft/Skype, supra note, at ¶¶ 66, 77, 81.
Microsoft/Skype, supra note, at ¶ 81.
25
Jurisdictions that have not attempted a SSNDQ test to define the relevant market include
Canada (OECD Quality Report, supra note, at 60), Mexico (id. at 98), and the Ukraine (id.
at 117). On the other hand, the United Kingdom, in its reviews of hospital mergers, used
the framework of a “small but significant non-transitory decrease in quality” to define
product markets. Id. at 109. The delegate from the U.K. “emphasised that, while the UK
competition agencies may conduct SSNIP tests (and, implicitly, SSNDQ tests where
quality is a relevant competition consideration), the information obtained from these
assessments is simply one factor to be taken into account within a broader consideration of
the functioning of competition within a sector.” Id. at 163.
26
See, e.g., Microsoft/Skype, supra note, at ¶¶ 144-69.
27
See, e.g., Standard Oil Co. of N.J. v. United States,  221  U.S.  1,  52  (1911)  (“[T]he  evils  
which led to the public outcry against monopolies and to the final denial of the power to
make them [include] . . . [t]he danger of deterioration in quality of the monopolized article
which it was deemed was the inevitable resultant of the monopolistic control over its
production  and  sale.”).
24
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competition between undertakings.”28 The Commission adds that the aim of
its enforcement activity “in relation to exclusionary conduct is to ensure that
dominant undertakings do not impair effective competition by foreclosing
their competitors in an anti-competitive way, thus having an adverse impact
on consumer welfare, whether in the form of higher price levels than would
have otherwise prevailed or in some other form such as limiting quality or
reducing consumer choice.”29
Lastly, it is worth noting the competition   agencies’   hard line taken
against horizontal agreements to limit quality: “[c]o-ordinated efforts
between competitors to limit quality improvements or to degrade existing
quality  are  generally  most  appropriately  treated  as  equivalent  to  a  cartel.”30
Exceptions, such as industry standard-setting, product standardizations,
and safety codes, exist. But competitors generally cannot justify their
agreement to curtail competition along one important of dimension (namely
quality), on the grounds that they still compete along other dimensions
(such   as   price).   The   response,   under   the   agency’s   rule   of   thumb,   is   that  
consumers, not competitors, should make this price-quality trade-off.
In some instances, competition policy recognizes the possibility that
some restriction of competition may facilitate investment in services and
quality. In the context of vertical agreements, for example, some restrictions
on distribution, selective and exclusive vertical agreements,31 or resale price
28

Point 5, Guidance Paper on Article 102 TFEU - Guidance on the Commission's
enforcement priorities in applying Article 82 of the EC Treaty to abusive exclusionary
conduct by dominant undertakings, [2009] OJ C 45/7.
29
Point 19, Guidance Paper, supra.
30
OECD Quality Report, supra note, at 8 (Executive Summary); see also id. at 77
(European Union) (“Agreements that limit the quality of products or services fall within the
prohibition of anticompetitive agreements.”); National Macaroni Manufacturers
Association v. F.T.C., 345 F.2d 421 (7th Cir. 1965) (charging the National Macaroni
Manufacturers Association, its officers and member manufacturers of macaroni and
spaghetti products, with entering into and carrying “out agreements and understandings to
fix and determine the quality of macaroni products to the end that durum millers would
offer a blend of durum and other types of wheat rather than 100% Durum, and that the
macaroni manufacturers would use this blend,” doing so “for the purpose of depressing the
price of durum wheat and preventing its price from being established in the open market by
free competition, the effect being to eliminate quality competition in macaroni products”);
F.T.C.  v.  Indiana  Fed’n  of  Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 462-64 (1986).
31
C-439/09 Pierre  Fabre  v  Président  de  l’Autorité  de  la  concurrence [2011] 5 CMLR 31

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2494656

10

COMPETITION & QUALITY

maintenance,32 may prevent free-riding and may therefore be permitted.
II.

CONSUMERS’ ABILITY TO ASSESS QUALITY

Part I reviews how competition authorities generally treat quality
considerations in their analysis. Competition agencies regard quality as a
significant factor, but have difficulties measuring and appraising it.
Subsequently, they often do not attempt to quantify how the challenged
restraint will impact quality; instead, they rely on two heuristics.
In this Part we consider consumers’   ability   to   appraise   quality. We
illustrate how, at times, the agencies’   heuristics may not reflect market
reality.
As the Australian competition authorities explained, in competitive
markets with rational, well-informed consumers, price can signal quality
differences and enable consumers to trade-off between higher price and
higher quality.33 In such markets, the heuristics work well: quality is
positively correlated with competition, and well-informed rational
consumers will choose from the offerings the closest match to their desired
price/quality mix.
We begin with rational consumers with willpower and discuss several
cases where this positive correlation between competition and quality
breaks down. Critical in our analysis are industry characteristics. We
identify two necessary conditions: first, it is prohibitively expensive or
difficult to convey to consumers the inherent quality differences in the
product offerings; and second, consumers’ ability to accurately assess
quality differences is limited.
Thus the problem is unlikely to arise with search goods,  “whose quality
32

Marvel and McCafferty argue that consumers rely on retailers to assist them in
determining whether products are of high or low quality. Howard P. Marvel & Stephen
McCafferty, Resale Price Maintenance and Quality Certification, 15 No 3 RAND
JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS 346, 346-359 (1984). They note that a “consumer's preferred
environment is likely to depend on his ability to engage in self-certification of products and
on the ability of manufacturers to convey product quality information independently of the
dealers.” Id. at 359; for the authors’ economic model see id. at 349-358.
33
OECD Quality Report, supra note, at 44 (Australia).
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consumers can inspect and investigate before purchase.”34 Rather the
correlation between competition and quality is likelier to break down with
experience goods, whose quality consumers may evaluate only after
purchase and consumption, and credence goods, whose quality consumers
generally cannot evaluate.35 The correlation between price and quality
relies, to a large extent, on the satisfactory functioning of the markets,
which in turn, to a large extent, relies on an adequate flow of information
from producers to consumers and between customers. Indeed, information
flow has long been recognized as one of the pillars that support competitive
markets and a valuable attribute of consumer welfare.36
A. Advertising and Information Flow
It is generally expected that the flow of information through price and
non-price advertising will assist consumers in making better choices in
relation to the purchase of goods and services by identifying sellers,
providing terms of sales, and information on products, their quality,
characteristics and price. This freedom of choice facilitates competition by
widening the range of known substitutes that consumers take into account,
as well as their price sensitivity.
The flow of information increases market transparency and makes it
easier for consumers to compare the quality and prices of advertised goods
between outlets, thus making it harder for retailers to exercise market power
by increasing the price or degrading the quality of the advertised goods. In
this respect, advertising, being the most visible way through which
companies communicate their products’ and services’  price  and  quality, can

34

Dr. Seuss Enterprises, L.P. v. Penguin Books USA, Inc., 924 F. Supp. 1559, 1573 (S.D.
Cal. 1996), aff'd, 109 F.3d 1394 (9th Cir. 1997).
35
Such as expert services, dietary supplements etc. See Denis W. Stearns, On (Cr)edibility:
Why Food in the United States May Never Be Safe, 21 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 245, 248–
249 (2010).
36
George J. Stigler, The Economics of Information, 69 JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY
213, 213-225 (1961); OECD, 2001; Dr Rainer Nitsche & Nils von Hinten-Reed,
Competitive Impacts of Information Exchange, CHARLES RIVER ASSOCIATES 1, 1-31
(2004). For discussion on the importance of efficient information flows in healthcare
markets, see William M. Sage & Peter J. Hammer, Competing on Quality of Care: The
Need to Develop a Competition Policy for Health Care Markets, 32 U. MICH. J.L. REF.
1069, 1090 (1999).
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make markets more competitive and efficient.37
Deception38 does not occur in perfectly competitive markets, which
have transparent prices, highly elastic demand curves, easy entry and exit,
and perfectly-informed, profit-maximizing buyers and sellers who are so
numerous that each can act as a price-taker. Likewise, in a perfectly
competitive marketplace of ideas, truth quickly and costlessly prevails
through “the widest possible dissemination of information from diverse and
antagonistic sources.”39
In many markets, competition is imperfect to begin with. Market
dynamics are less formidable. Buyers are unable to detect and punish the
misleading firm; inaccuracies remain unexposed. At times, however,
advertising might inaccurately depict the product characteristics and quality.
It is worth noting that the common law does not recognize a claim for fraud
where   the   defect   is   obvious   to   one’s   senses.40 Consumers can, at times,
discover and swiftly punish such deceptive (illegal or legal) claims of
quality.41 A web based selling platform provides a good illustration. Web
and consumer forums may limit the one sided freedom of advertisers. When
customers’   reviews   are   available   online,   the   real   quality   of   product   or  
service is easier to determine. While information may be subjected to
manipulation—by producers, sellers and competitors—a large volume of
financially disinterested reviews may correct such anomalies. In other
instances consumers may play a role in exposing the truth.
But in many markets, it is time-consuming and costly to verify (if one
could) every material statement’s trustworthiness independently. The
marketplace of ideas, even in industries with marketing-savvy competitors,
37

Note,  in  particular,  the  UK  retailer  Marks  and  Spencer’s  effective  advertising  to  promote  
its investments in food safety and quality. Denis W. Stearns, On (Cr)edibility: Why Food in
the United States May Never Be Safe, 21 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 245, 254–256 (2010).
38
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 406  (6th  ed.  1990)  (defining  deception  as  “[k]nowingly and
willfully making a false statement or representation, express or implied, pertaining to a
present   or   past   existing   fact”);;   RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 551(2)(e) (1977)
(deception  includes  knowingly  withholding  “facts  basic  to  a  transaction”).
39
Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945).
40
REST. (SECOND) TORTS § 541 (the recipient of a fraudulent misrepresentation is not
justified in relying upon its truth if he knows that it is false, or its falsity is obvious to him).
41
See, for example, sites such as www.ripoffreport.com
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does not always expose deception.42 Consequently, deceptive and
misleading advertising requires two important deviations from the
competitive ideal: (1) falsity is not quickly exposed in the marketplace of
ideas, and (2) competition is not effectively based on the merits.
In some markets, the enforcement agency can detect some breaches.
One example is   Intel’s   deception   that   caused   the   public   to   believe   its  
competitor’s   sluggish   performance   was   to   due   to   poor   quality (rather than
Intel’s   mischief). The FTC alleged that Intel introduced compiler features
that “effectively slowed the performance of software written using Intel’s
compilers” on competing non-Intel central processing units (CPUs). Intel’s
deception, the FTC alleged, caused “the unknowing public, [original
equipment manufacturers] OEMs, and software vendors” to believe that
“the slower performance of non-Intel-based computers when running
certain software applications” was attributable to “the performance of nonIntel CPUs.”43 Intel, the FTC alleged, “intentionally misrepresented the
cause of the performance differences and whether it could be solved.”44
Not only did Intel help maintain its monopoly through its deception, but its
deception “distorted the competitive dynamic and harmed consumers.”45

42

Coca-Cola,   822   F.2d   at   31   (rejecting   the   claim   that   “the   advertising   industry   is   a   selfpolicing  industry  that  considers  claims  of  misrepresentations  of  quality”).
43
Federal Register Notice: Intel Corporation; Analysis of Proposed Consent Order (August
10, 2010).
44
Federal Register Notice: Intel Corporation; Analysis of Proposed Consent Order (August
10, 2010). As the FTC alleged:
Intel’s  deceptive   disclosures  related  to  its  compiler  redesign   were  compounded  by  
the adoption of industry standard benchmarks that included software compiled using
Intel’s   compiler.   Benchmarks   are   performance   tests   that   compare   attributes   of  
competing CPUs. Industry standard benchmarks are used by OEMs and consumers
to judge performance of competing CPUs. Intel failed to disclose to benchmarking
organizations the effects of its compiler redesign on non-Intel CPUs. Several
benchmarking organizations adopted benchmarks that measured performance of
CPUs by running software programs compiled using the Intel compiler. The
software  compiled  using  Intel’s  compiler  skewed  the  performance  results  in  Intel’s  
favor.  Intel  promoted  its  systems’  performance  under  such  benchmarks  as  realistic  
measures of typical or “real world” computer performance. The benchmarks were
not accurate or realistic measures of typical computer performance and they
overstated  the  performance  of  Intel’s  products  as  compared  to  non-Intel products.
45
Id.  (“Among  the  harms  to  consumers  caused  by  Intel’s  deceptive  conduct  was  the   harm
to the credibility and reliability of industry benchmarks. Industry benchmarks are important
tools for consumers to make informed purchasing choices. Informed consumer choice is a
basic  building  block  of  competition.”).
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However, at times, communications while still portraying an inaccurate
image of a product and its quality may fall below the illegal ‘deception’  
threshold. One example is the variety of misleading food-labeling standards
in the United States. Consumers   rely   on   labels   such   as   “organic”   and  
“USDA   inspected   and   passed”   to   indicate   that food is safe, when these
labels do not guarantee food safety.46 Similarly, investors rely on credit
rating agencies to assess the risk of financial products, but an issuer of
financial products will only advertise the most favorable risk assessment.
“Thus, the market may see an opinion that is scrupulously honest but is still
an  outlier.”47
At times, the   natural   exercise   of   market   powers   may   ‘correct’   such
distorted flow of information. Such may be the case when other competitors
engage in counter advertising or lobbying campaigns and expose the truth
about the product or service. For example, Texas-based rival H.E.B.
exposed US retailer Wal-Mart’s  deceptive cost-saving claims.48
However, absent clear benchmarks for quality, advertising and
marketing may promote an illusion of quality. Asymmetric information as
to various products’ and services’   true   quality provides an easy forum for
inaccurate signals, which are difficult for customers to decipher when
comparing and contrasting quality with price. With significant
informational asymmetries, misleading and deceptive advertising can distort
competition. Consumers cannot easily and accurately assess quality and
price. Their search costs in choosing quality products increase. The
transaction costs for honest sellers increase in seeking to differentiate their
higher quality products and to reap the financial, reputation-related rewards
associated with their products. Other strategies may raise rivals’ costs (in
having to respond to a competitor’s deceptive statements), create market
distortions, and impose a deadweight welfare loss as consumers forgo or
minimize purchases of better quality products that absent the deceptive
46

Stearns, supra note, at 260, 271–272.
Rosa M. Abrantes-Metz, Is there Misdiagnosis and Mistreatment in the Market for
Credit Ratings?, 12(2) CPI ANTITRUST CHRONICLE 1, 7 (2013).
48
H.E. Butt proposed that the basis for such claims was a faulty study commissioned by the
company. Vicki Vaughan, H-E-B Beats Wal-Mart on Advertised Claim of Big Savings: HE-B Beats Wal-Mart in Court in Ad Case, SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS-NEWS, June 24, 2009,
http://www.chron.com/business/article/H-E-B-beats-Wal-Mart-on-advertised-claim-of-big1614157.php.
47
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practices they would have purchased. In addition, the exploitation of
network effects, the increase of entry barriers for new products (whose
qualities and risks cannot be quickly assessed) and the foreclosure of
markets to new services,49 may undermine competition on quality.
Consequently, competition authorities should exercise caution when
applying their two heuristics in markets characterized with false advertising
claims. When consumers act with incomplete knowledge, and it is
prohibitively expensive or difficult to convey to consumers the products’
inherent quality differences, then one cannot assume that more competition
will necessarily improve the price-quality mix.
B. Reassuringly Expensive
Many products and services are differentiated by price and quality.
Absent other readily available information on quality, consumers will often
rely on a product’s or   service’s   price as a proxy for quality. Consumers
basically rely on the  heuristic,  “You  get  what  you  pay  for.”50 In assuming
that quality is positively correlated with price, consumers believe that
market forces generally will expose inferior products at inflated prices.
Thus as the Australian competition authority explained, in competitive
markets with rational, well-informed consumers, price can signal quality
differences and enable consumers to trade-off between price and higher
quality.51
49

By, for example, creating “lemon” markets where dishonest dealers for goods or services
drive out honest dealers, thereby inhibiting innovation in these markets. Maurice E. Stucke,
How  Do  (And  Should)  Competition  Authorities  Treat  A  Dominant  Firm’s   Deception?, 63
SMU L. REV. 1069, 1073-74 (2010).
50
Likewise courts apply the heuristic when evaluating the reasonableness of attorney’s
fees. See, e.g., Helfrich v. Carle Clinic Ass’n., P.C., 328 F.3d 915, 919 (7th Cir. 2003); In
re Checking Account Overdraft Litig., 830 F. Supp. 2d 1330, 1363 (S.D. Fla. 2011) (“As
with most things, you get what you pay for, and the Settlement Class received a truly
impressive amount and quality of legal services. In the private marketplace, as pointed out
by several of Plaintiffs’   experts,   counsel   of   exceptional   skill   commands   a   significant  
premium.”); S.E.C. v. Mut. Benefits Corp., 04-60573CIV, 2009 WL 4640654 (S.D. Fla.
Dec. 7, 2009) (“Few would disagree that, in complex matters, you get what you pay for.”);
Bockman v. Lucky Stores, Inc., CIV S 83-039 RAR, 1986 WL 425 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 20,
1986) (“The Court strongly believes that you get what you pay for. Although reasonable
minds will differ as to what the going rate should be, the Court takes into consideration the
training and expertise of plaintiffs' counsel.”).
51
OECD Quality Report, supra note, at 44 (Australia).
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At times price accurately reflects quality. One indeed gets what one
pays for. Sometimes, however, the correlation is weaker.52 When quality is
subjective or difficult to assess, consumers may believe that price positively
relates to quality, even when it does not. As the European Commission
recognized,
In some cases, the (perceived) quality correlates with price positioning of
a given product or service. The more customers perceive the products as
being of high quality (by way of its proper characteristics or by
marketing), the more they are willing to pay for it and the more the
observed prices of the given products differ. Such vertical differentiation
may help to define a group of products which are positioned at a similar
level and which compete against each other, and which customers still
regard as substitutes. For example, price levels can be indicative of the
(perceived) quality positioning of brands (in the watches example, luxury
watches are several times more expensive than technically comparable
‘regular’ watch brands).53

This is further complicated if consumers subjectively believe that the
higher priced good is indeed better. The higher price affects the experience
52

Sage & Hammer, supra note, at 1078-88 (noting that courts in antitrust cases often
follow simpler models of competition based on price and output, either ignoring quality as
a competitive dimension or assuming that it will occur in tandem with price competition);
OFT Report, supra note, at § 3.113:
When prices become flexible, the consumer’s decision problem becomes more
complex. They now have to examine two bits of information: past track records
about quality and price. It turns out that the vast majority of consumers simply focus
on price. This leads to Betrand-style competition and very low prices but also to
poorer average quality of products traded. Prices fall to such a low level that highquality production becomes hardly sustainable for firms and low quality almost
acceptable for consumers. In other words, there is both, a push and a pull, towards
lower quality and, thus, total welfare is lower in the presence of price competition
than under a (comparatively high) regulated price.
53
OECD Quality Report, supra note, at 79 (European Union). Likewise, consumers may
perceive Clorox bleach better quality since it costs more than the chemically
indistinguishable, but cheaper private label bleach. FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386
U.S. 568 (1967). Clorox invested millions of dollars in promoting its brand of bleach, and
often charged a higher price for its bleach. One would think that a market, where one
company sells a fungible chemically indistinguishable product at a price premium, would
be attractive for potential entrants. But Procter & Gamble sought to purchase Clorox rather
than enter the liquid bleach market independently. For the intersection of brands and
competition policy, see Deven R. Desai & Spencer Weber Waller, Brands, Competition
and the Law, 2010 BRIGHAM YOUNG U. L. REV. 1425 (2010).
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the consumers feel from the otherwise regular product. Several behavioral
experiments revealed the power of higher prices.54 In one experiment,
nearly all the participants reported less pain after taking a placebo priced at
$2.50 per dose; when the placebo was discounted to $0.10 per dose, only
half of the participants experienced less pain.55 Similarly, MIT students who
paid regular price for the “SoBe Adrenaline Rush” beverage reported less
fatigue than the students who paid one-third of regular price for the same
drink.56 SoBe Adrenaline Rush beverage was next promoted as energy for
the students’ mind; students, after drinking the placebo, had to solve as
many word puzzles as possible within thirty minutes. Students who paid
regular price for the drink got on average nine correct responses. Students
who paid a discounted price for the same drink got on average 6.5 questions
right.57
Similarly, according to researchers at the Stanford Graduate School of
Business and the California Institute of Technology:
[I]f a person is told he or she is tasting two different wines—and that one
costs $5 and the other $45 when they are, in fact, the same wine—the
part of the brain that experiences pleasure will become more active when
the drinker thinks he or she is enjoying the more expensive vintage.58
54

DAN ARIELY, PREDICTABLY IRRATIONAL: THE HIDDEN FORCES THAT SHAPE OUR
DECISIONS 181-86 (HarperCollins 2008).
55
Id. at 182-83.
56
Id. at 184-85.
57
Id. at 185-86.
58
News Release, Stanford Univ. News Serv., Price Tag Can Change the Way People
Experience Win, Study Shows (Jan. 15, 2008), available at http://newsservice.stanford.edu/pr/2008/pr-wine-011608.html. As the study found,
Because perceptions of quality are known to be positively correlated with price,
the individual is likely to believe that a more expensive wine will probably taste
better. Our hypothesis goes beyond this by stipulating that higher taste
expectations would lead to higher activity in the medial orbitofrontal cortex
(mOFC), an area of the brain that is widely thought to encode for actual
experienced pleasantness. The results described below are consistent with this
hypothesis. We found that the reported price of wines markedly affected
reported EP and, more importantly, also modulated the blood-oxygen-leveldependent (BOLD) signal in mOFC.
Hilke Plassmann, John O'Doherty, Baba Shiv, and Antonio Rangel, Marketing Actions Can
Modulate Neural Representations of Experienced Pleasantness, PNAS 2008 105 (3) 10501054; published ahead of print January 14, 2008, doi:10.1073/pnas.0706929105;;  see also
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Here too we see in these markets the two necessary conditions:
consumers act with incomplete knowledge, and it is prohibitively expensive
or difficult to convey to consumers the products’ inherent quality
differences.
Companies recognize that neither they nor their competitors can easily
or inexpensively convey to consumers the inherent quality differences in
their  and  their  competitors’ product offerings. The producers also recognize
that consumers may rely on price as a proxy of quality (i.e., you get what
you pay for) and cannot independently assess differences   in   the   products’  
quality. Thus, companies may charge a higher price to signal superior
quality that their product may or may not necessarily have. A drug
manufacturer may not want its drug priced lower than other pills (which
might signal inferior quality). Customers may report a better experience due
to higher prices (rather than the pill’s superior attributes) thus incentivising
producers to charge higher prices. Indeed, quality will not necessarily
correlate with competition. This is not deception per se, but the producers’
manipulating a consumer heuristic of associating price with quality.
***
As Part I discusses,   the   agencies’   two   heuristics   assume   that rational
consumers with willpower will understand price to signal quality
differences and will tradeoff between lower priced, lower quality goods and
higher quality, higher priced goods. But this Part provides two scenarios
that illustrate that even with rational consumers with willpower, price will
not necessarily positively correlate with quality. The link between price and
quality is therefore more complex than one might expect. Quality and price
at times are positively correlated, whereby higher price signals better
quality. But informational asymmetries can limit the  consumer’s  ability  to  
determine the level of quality based on price and thereby limit quality
competition. The above discussion highlights that consumers may not
always respond as the agencies expect them to -- not because of an
Jonathan D. Glater & Alan Finder, In Tuition Game, Popularity Rises With Price, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 12, 2006, at A1 (discussing how Ursinus College, believing it was losing
applicants because of its low tuition, raised its tuition and fees 17.6% in 2000 (but offered
more financial aid) and received nearly 200 more applications the following year).
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unforeseen bias or heuristic but rather because of the information landscape
in which consumers operate and their ability to analyze and decode that
information. As hinted above, this vagueness affects not only consumers’
but also the competition agencies’ ability to examine in detail and balance
quality and consumer welfare. In the next Part we flip the coin to consider
how market realities affect  the  producer’s  or  service  provider’s  incentive  to  
invest in quality, especially when consumers’ biases, heuristics and
imperfect willpower hinder their ability to assess quality.
III.

PRODUCERS’ LIMITED INVESTMENT IN QUALITY

This Part considers the ways in which market reality may affect the
producer’s  or  service  provider’s  incentive  to  invest  in  quality. Again we see
in these markets the two necessary, but not sufficient, conditions—
consumers acting with incomplete knowledge, and producers finding it
unprofitable or difficult to convey to consumers the products’ inherent
quality differences.
In these markets, we consider how information difficulties, externalities,
market conditions or collusion may undermine firms’ incentive to invest in
quality. Interestingly, in some cases firms may underinvest in quality
despite seemingly competitive market conditions or price competition.
A. Communication Imperfections
Part II.A considers instances where through marketing, advertising, and
other promotions, consumers cannot easily and accurately differentiate
between products and services according to actual quality dimensions.
Naturally, these limitations affect not only consumers but also the
producers’  and  service  providers’  incentive  to  invest  in  quality.
A disincentive to invest in quality may emerge where the quality
information is inherently difficult to convey and the consumer’s   ability   to  
determine the level of quality is limited. This will especially be the case
when important vertical quality dimensions are not readily quantifiable, and
firms cannot afford, due to significant competitive pressure, to invest in
educating consumers of their products’ quality improvement.
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When customers lack the knowledge and expertise to assess product
quality accurately, firms may not be rewarded for improving quality. As
competition   authorities   recognize,   “higher   quality   does   not   attract
consumers under the conditions of significant information asymmetry
between the seller and the buyer in respect of consumer properties of the
goods.”59 The UK’s competition authorities observed:
Buyers may not know, for example, how quality varies across brands.
Markets where customers may be unsure about quality include those for
professional services, used goods and complex mechanical or electronic
products. When, as a result of information asymmetries, customers are
unable to form an accurate assessment of product quality (eg if they
consistently underestimate the probability of product failure), a market
may operate inefficiently. Imperfect information about quality can be a
particularly severe problem for infrequently purchased goods or goods
the quality of which cannot be verified even after purchase—so-called
‘credence’ goods.60

We can return to our Intel example. In its decision, the European
Commission observed in the market for central processing units (CPUs)
how “[a]ccording to a recent market survey, price is by far the most
important   factor   when   choosing   a   computer   at   retail   level…   Quality   and  
therefore also CPU awareness play a secondary role, in particular because
consumers tend to lack the respective technical knowledge to develop a
preference for Intel or [its competitor’s] CPUs.”61 David Evans discussed
how this phenomenon,  sometimes  known  as  the  ‘lemons problem,’ caused
the US videogame market to collapse:
Consumers could not distinguish low quality from high quality games
before buying them. Producers therefore had incentives to create cheaper
low quality games that drove the high quality games out of the market.
But consumers did not want to buy video game consoles to run low
quality games.62
59

OECD Quality Report, supra note, at 115 (Ukraine).
OECD Quality Report, supra note, at 113 (United Kingdom).
61
Footnote 1919, COMP/37.990 Intel Corporation [2009] OJ C 227/07 at n [1919].
62
David S. Evans, Governing Bad Behavior by Users of Multi-Sided Platforms, 27
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1201, 1215 (2012). For an application of the lemons problem to food
markets, see Stearns, supra note, at 266 (“In other words, if everyone in an industry pays to
the same extent when unsafe or poor quality goods are sold, a greater profit can be made by
60
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Consequently, more competition may not yield greater quality when
firms have difficulty explaining the quality improvement to the consumer,
rivals can confuse consumers with similar claims, consumers cannot readily
identify the better quality products, and as a result the innovator’s sales and
profits do not increase.63 In those instances the cost of quality improvement
outweighs the likely gain.
B. Two-Sided Markets
In some two-sided markets, a firm offers a product or service for free to
consumers and in turn sells to advertisers the ability to access these
consumers. As discussed earlier, when the product or service is offered for
free, the primary dimension of competition is quality. But when the
producer primarily earns its profits from one side of the market (such as
advertising), its incentive to degrade quality (below levels that consumers
prefer) on the other side of the market can increase.
The European Commission discussed this scenario in the internet
search/search advertising markets.64 A search engine is a matchmaker
between advertisers and consumers searching for products, services or
information. The search engine provides “organic (or algorithmic) and
advertising (or sponsored) results.”65 Search engines therefore compete for
consumers by providing quality (more relevant and quicker) search
competing on price rather than quality, so long as the consumer cannot tell the
difference.”).
63
Indeed trademark law is based on preventing this result. See Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A.
Lemley, The Merchandising Right: Fragile Theory or Fait Accompli?, 54 EMORY L.J. 461,
466 (2005):
A brand-based assurance of quality would mean nothing if imitators could apply
it to their own products and pass them off as having come from the trademark
holder. The result would be higher search costs for consumers and a disincentive
to firms to invest in goodwill and quality products and services. Trademark law
evolved specifically to avoid this result. Doctrinally, trademark law prevents
interlopers  from  appropriating  trademark  holders’  goodwill  by  using  their  marks  
in a way that suggests some association, affiliation, or sponsorship between the
parties or their products. Economically, trademark law reduces consumer search
costs and facilitates investment in goodwill by protecting the accuracy of
trademark-related investments in advertising and product quality.
64
Microsoft/Yahoo! Search, supra note, at ¶¶ 202-04. The Commission left open whether
internet search constituted a separate market. Id. ¶¶ 85-86.
65
Microsoft/Yahoo! Search, supra note, at ¶ 100.
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results.66 But as the European Commission found, a search engine provider
can also have the incentive to degrade the quality of its search results: the
more relevant “organic” results the search engine provides, the less likely
that consumers will click on the sponsored results, and the less potential
advertising revenue the search engine generates.67 Thus, the search engine
can have the incentive to promote—and rank higher—its sponsored results
and provide fewer–and rank lower--the organic results.68 A firm is likelier
to degrade its search results, the European Commission noted, when the
competing search engines provide different organic results and “it is
inherently difficult for the user to assess whether the platform engages in
this behavior.”69
The European Commission did not believe that the Microsoft/Yahoo!
transaction would cause the parties to degrade the quality of its search
engine results, given Google’s presence.70 But the Commission currently is
investigating Google in part for degrading the quality of its search results.
As part of its preliminary conclusions, the Commission found Google to
abuse its dominant position, by inter alia, promoting its own search services
over rivals’ services for specific categories of information, like hotels and
restaurants. Consumers, the Commission observed, “are not aware of the
promotion of Google’s services within the search results,” and are harmed
when Google marginalizes equally relevant (or potentially more relevant)
competing search services.71
Google is dominant in the search engine market, but this quality
degradation can also occur in other, more competitive two-sided markets.
For example, newspapers may compete vigorously in their news coverage,
but may skew their news coverage through self-censorship to avoid
offending an important category of advertisers. Radio stations can skew
playlists to music companies that pay them for airing their songs.72
66

Microsoft/Yahoo! Search, supra note, at ¶ 101.
Microsoft/Yahoo! Search, supra note, at ¶ 204.
68
Microsoft/Yahoo! Search, supra note, at ¶ 204.
69
Microsoft/Yahoo! Search, supra note, at ¶ 204.
70
Microsoft/Yahoo! Search, supra note, at ¶ 212.
71
European Commission, Press Release, Antitrust: Commission Obtains from Google
Comparable Display of Specialised Search Rivals (Feb. 5, 2014).
72
After a series of scandals where music companies paid radio stations to play certain
songs, the FCC promulgated “payola” rules where the broadcaster must disclose such
67
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Consequently, in two-sided markets, producers may degrade the quality of
the free product, when doing so maximizes revenue from the other side of
the market, such as advertising revenue. Here again we see this is likelier
when first, consumers cannot discern the degradation in quality, because
they lack objective benchmarks, and second, it is prohibitively expensive or
difficult for rivals to convey to consumers the inherent quality differences in
the product offerings.
C. Exploiting Consumer Biases and Imperfect Willpower
Firms will also have a disincentive to invest in quality when debiasing
consumers and improving their willpower are costly and unprofitable. In
competitive markets, one expects firms to provide products and services
that help address issues for consumers. One problem is that consumers, on
account of their overconfidence, general optimism, or failure to appreciate
the full extent of their imperfect willpower, may feel they do not need a
given product or service. When the cost of educating the customer cannot
be recovered or when the investment is exposed to free-riding, companies
may underinvest in quality products.
For example, financial products can be tailored to help consumers
reduce the risk of default and increase savings. But consumers can be
overoptimistic on their ability and willpower to pay the credit card
purchases timely. They underestimate the costs of their future borrowings.
So the optimistic consumers would ordinarily choose credit cards with
lower annual fees (but higher financing fees and penalties) over better
suited products (e.g., credit cards with higher annual fees but lower interest
rates and late payment penalties).
In principle, competition can promote this quality dimension in several
respects: first the quality of services to help debias consumers, second, the
quality of the financial product (in reducing risk and addressing the
consumers’ needs), and third the quality of service in forewarning
consumers of competitors’ attempt to exploit them. However, firms, facing
intense competition, may find that it makes more sense to unilaterally offer
similar lower-quality products that exploit consumer biases, rather than
payments. http://www.fcc.gov/guides/payola-rules.
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incurring the costs to provide quality informational services to help
consumers debias.
Suppose it is expensive for a credit card issuer to educate consumers of
the likely total costs of using the credit card, their bounded willpower, and
their overconfidence. The credit card issuer will not invest in debiasing
consumers if other competitors can successfully free-ride on the company’s
educational efforts and quickly offer similar credit cards with lower fees.
Alternatively, the credit card company will not invest if the debiased
consumers do not remain with the helpful credit card company. The
debiased consumers switch to the remaining exploiting credit card issuers,
where they, along with the other sophisticated customers, benefit from the
exploitation (such as getting airline miles for their purchases, while not
incurring any late fees). Under either scenario, debiasing reduces the credit
card company’s profits, without offering any lasting competitive advantage.
Consequently, the industry profits more in exploiting consumers’ biases,
heuristics, and imperfect willpower. Naïve consumers will not demand
better-suited products. Firms have little financial incentive to help naïve
consumers choose better products. Market supply skews toward products
and services that exploit or reinforce consumers’ bounded willpower and
rationality.
At times consumers consider the short-term immediate price rather than
the long-term cost from the use of the product. Consumers, for example,
purchase a lower quality, less expensive washing machine, when they could
save more money over the long term by purchasing a higher quality, more
efficient machine. The Indonesian competition authority explained how
consumer biases and imperfect willpower can adversely affect the supply of
higher-quality goods that improve consumers’ welfare:
A market dominated by short-term oriented consumers is actually
unfavorable for the market leader because it will be difficult for the
market leader to improve the loyalty of consumers. The consumers are
easily tempted by offers, advertisement/gimmick, or discounts from the
competitor. As a result, the action often taken by the business actors as
the solution is by reducing the price of the product. The consumers are
not very much aware of a deterioration of quality of a product as long as
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the price is affordable.73

Nor is competition the solution. Entry and greater competition, as one
recent survey found, can worsen, rather than improve, the situation:
The most striking result of the literature so far is that increasing
competition through fostering entry of more firms may not on its own
always improve outcomes for consumers. Indeed competition may not
help when there are at least some consumers who do not search properly
or have difficulties judging quality and prices...In the presence of such
consumers it is no longer clear that firms necessarily have an incentive to
compete by offering better deals. Rather, they can focus on exploiting
biased consumers who are very likely to purchase from them regardless
of price and quality. These effects can be made worse through firms’
deliberate attempts to make price comparisons and search harder
(through complex pricing, shrouding, etc) and obscure product quality.
The incentives to engage in such activities become more intense when
there are more competitors.74

Here too we see in these markets the two necessary, but not sufficient,
conditions, but with a slight twist. First, consumers act with incomplete
knowledge. They misjudge not only the product’s quality,75 but also the
degree of their own biases and willpower. The consumers desire certain
objectives (such as increasing savings, less risk) but misjudge their future
behavior. Consumers may overestimate their frequency to go to the gym,
and thereby select an annual membership when a per visit membership
would be cheaper.76
Second, in these markets firms cannot attain a competitive advantage in
building trust and reputation by debiasing consumers or not exploiting their
biases and imperfect willpower. In these markets, it is prohibitively
expensive or difficult to debias, or doing so does not secure additional
73

OECD Quality Report, supra note, at 86 (Indonesia).
OFT Report, supra note, at § 6.2.
75
OFT Report, supra note, at § 1.10 (“Likewise, consumers that have difficulties judging
quality can mistake inferior goods for superior goods. In these situations firms can focus on
exploiting biased consumers who are likely to purchase from them regardless of price and
quality. Under these conditions increased competition does not help because consumers do
not improve their decision making.”).
76
DellaVigna, supra note, at 320.
74
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business from the debiased consumer (who can benefit from the behavioral
exploitation of others by choosing the credit card that offers customers
perks).
These outcomes not only affect the producers’ incentive to invest in
quality, they may also enable it to exploit an information bias. Such may be
the case, as illustrated in Part II, when information and communications are
inaccurate or misleading.
D. Exploiting the Imperfect Market
Competition authorities rely on the heuristic that when prices and
quality vary, consumers will weigh the offerings using an internal pricequality metric. Thus if products have multiple dimensions of quality, one
can imagine a dizzying array of products, with different prices, touting
different attributes. So one perceived benefit of competition is its providing
consumers with more choices of goods and services.77 The economic
theories underlying competition law presume that increasing variety to meet
consumer demand increases well-being, as consumers can more easily
select the option that best meets their needs and wants (i.e., the more
options I have, the likelier I will find the product that closely matches my
internal price-quality preference).
As the number of product attributes increase, the information regarding
each differentiated option increases as well; the required attention and
burden on deliberative, System 2 thinking to process the information
increase as consumers trade-off   the   options’   relative benefits and
disadvantages.78
Enter choice overload, which consumers at times suffer when trying to
decide among many (often complex) options.79 As product attributes
77

Addis v. Holy Cross Health Sys. Corp., 3:94 CV 118 AS, 1995 WL 914278 (N.D. Ind.
July 6, 1995) (recognizing the benefits of competition include higher quality and greater
choice); Swarthmore Radiation Oncology, Inc. v. Lapes, CIV. A. 92-3055, 1993 WL
517722 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 1, 1993); Police Jury Ass'n of La., Inc. v. State, 36 So. 3d 942, 947
(La. App. 1 Cir. 2010).
78
Ellen Peters et al., More Is Not Always Better: Intuitions About Public Policy Can Lead
to Unintended Health Consequences, 7 SOCIAL ISSUES & POLICY REV. 114, 117-18 (2013).
79
Adi Ayal, Harmful Freedom of Choice: Lessons from the Cellphone Market, 74 LAW
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increase in complexity, one cannot expect consumers to invest extensive
time and energy into understanding all the available options, in searching
for and comparing price and quality, and choosing the product that closely
matches their preferences, all at the expense of other mental pursuits.80 At
times consumers lack clear preferences, and simply stick with the default
option.81 At times when confronted by many options, people simply avoid
choosing, even when any choice is preferable to not choosing.82 As a result,
they forgo potentially superior options and maintain the status quo to their
detriment.83 At other times, cognitive   overload   reduces   consumers’   selfcontrol, leading them to ignore product attributes which they value, and
accept simple or default options.84 Interestingly, the need to evaluate a
number of different options may itself harm welfare. Although consumers
generally appreciate choice, “the  tendency  to  search  long  and  hard  reduces  
enjoyment from the end result.”85
One issue is when companies take advantage of consumers’ difficulty in
processing many complex options. Producers, by creating complex
AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS 91,

94 (2011).
Id. See also Lisbet Berg & Åse Gornitzka, The Consumer Attention Deficit Syndrome:
Consumer Choices in Complex Markets, 55 ACTA SOCIOLOGICA 159, 171-72 (2012).
81
RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT
HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS (Yale Univ. Press 2008).
82
Gerri Spassova & Alice M. Isen, Positive Affect Moderates the Impact of Assortment Size
on Choice Satisfaction, 89 J. RETAILING 397, 398 (2013); Marianne Bertrand et al., What’s  
Advertising Content Worth? Evidence from a Consumer Credit Marketing Field
Experiment, 125 Q. J. ECON. 263, 268 (2010).
83
Simona Botti & Sheena S. Iyengar, The Dark Side of Choice: When Choice Impairs
Social Welfare, 25 J. PUBLIC POLICY & MARKETING 24, 28 (2006); Chris M. Wilson &
Catherine Waddams Price, Do Consumers Switch to the Best Supplier?, 62 OXFORD
ECONOMIC PAPERS , 98, 98-131 (2011). (“A   fascinating   study  examining   the  relationship  
between the number of funds from which employees could choose and their actual choice
showed a clear tendency to avoid choosing altogether (and thus implicitly choose none) as
the  number  of  alternatives  increased.”). Choice overload is not ubiquitous, nor are all of its
preconditions well understood. Consumers do not always regret their choice from a large
selection. Benjamin Scheibehenne et al., Can There Ever Be Too Many Options? A MetaAnalytic Review of Choice Overload, 37 J. CONSUMER RESEARCH 409, 412, 416 (2010)
(finding mixed results on choice overload from meta-analysis of 50 experiments); but see
Alexander Chernev et al., Commentary on Scheibehenne, Greifeneder, and Todd, Choice
Overload: Is There Anything to It?, 37 J. CONSUMER RESEARCH 426, 427 (2010) (noting
that some experiments are designed to identify choice overload and then test factors that
may mitigate it, so that counting the number of experiments and combining their results are
not informative).
84
Ayal, supra note, at 95, 97-98, 103.
85
Id. at 103.
80

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2494656

28

COMPETITION & QUALITY

price/quality parameters, may facilitate consumer error or bias, to their
advantage. Here firms  add  options  and  increase  their  products’  complexity
to manipulate consumer demand by making it difficult to appraise quality
and compare products.86 Firms increase the consumers’ search and
evaluation costs, thus driving consumers to rely on basic signaling that
benefits the firms. One example is rankings. Consumers may ignore
complex attributes and focus on one simple parameter (such as basing their
judgment on ranking rather than continuous quality scores).87 Knowing
this, firms (like US law schools88) can be ingenious in finding ways to game
the ranking system without necessarily improving quality. Finally, firms
increase the complexity of their contracts   to   increase   their   customers’  
switching costs and to more effectively price discriminate.89 In short, firms
increase complexity to render market conditions less susceptible to effective
competition.
One study found that as competition in US telecommunication markets
increased, telecommunication providers offered more complicated, badvalue price plans.90 The increased competition caused “cellphone providers
to focus on raising profitability through creating confusion and gaining
from   consumer   mistakes,” rather than from charging monopoly prices.91
One criticism of the mobile phone industry is its deliberately increasing
86

See, e.g., Xavier Gabaix & David Laibson, Shrouded Attributes, Consumer Myopia, and
Information Suppression in Competitive Markets, 121 Q.J. ECON. 505, 505-08 (2006);
Oren Bar-Gill & Elizabeth Warren, Making Credit Safer, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 27-28
(2008); SIMON JOHNSON & JAMES KWAK, 13 BANKERS: THE WALL STREET TAKEOVER AND
THE NEXT FINANCIAL MELTDOWN 81, 108 (Pantheon 2010).
87
DelleVigna, supra note 351 (discussing studies of the response of consumers to
published rankings of hospitals and colleges where the company constructs “a continuous
quality score from 0 to 100 largely based on reputation scores, and then creates rankings
based on this score” and while both the scores and the rankings are published in the yearly
report, the focus is on rank rather than score).
88
Alex Wellen, The $8.78 Million Maneuver, N.Y. TIMES, July 31, 2005,
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/07/31/education/edlife/wellen31.html?pagewanted=print&_
r=0, Ashby Jones, Here It Is: The 2009 U.S. News Law-School Ranking, WALL ST. J., Apr
22, 2009, http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2009/04/22/here-it-is-the-2009-us-news-law-schoolranking/.
89
Ayal, supra note, at 118   (“Contractual   complexity thus acts to raise switching costs,
which allows for raising prices to existing customers while hiding the existence of
discrimination  among  customers  paying  different  prices  for  similar  consumption.”).
90
See Eugenio J. Miravete, The Doubtful Profitability of Foggy Pricing 2–3 (NET Inst.,
Working Paper No. 04-07, 2004), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=618465.
91
Ayal, supra note, at 124.
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choice complexity to exploit consumers:
Too much and too complex information have made it
difficult for all but the most technologically savvy to choose
the product best suited to their needs. Customers unable to
choose based on attribute preferences appeared to make their
choices based on price, only to later find out that the product
did not meet their needs. This tendency is further
complicated by a lack of comprehension. When provided
with multiple options, consumers are only able to choose the
least expensive about 65% of the time. When faced with the
complex options of base service fees, additional features and
cost for usage overages, customers tend to choose plans that
greatly exceed their requirements, significantly overpaying
each month rather than risking the chance of occasional
overage costs. Problems navigating the telecommunications
industry are not limited to older adults, although they may be
particularly vulnerable.92
Similarly, another recent study found that a greater variety of price
plans in UK electricity markets led more consumers to choose suboptimally, harming their welfare.93 Ultimately, companies can design the
number and types of options they offer to exploit consumers’   cognitive  
overload.
Another approach includes firms selectively investing in quality. In
markets where customer feedback and reviews facilitate information flows,
the producer may identify areas where dimensions of quality are less
transparent and forms the point of least resistance. Accordingly, producers
will invest in the known dimensions of quality, which are subject to
scrutiny, but underinvest in the other quality dimensions. Food companies,
for example, may focus on visible aspects of quality such as taste and
appearance, ignoring features less visible to consumers, such as safety and
hygiene.94

92

Peters et al., supra note, at 122.
Wilson & Price, supra note, at 6–14; see also Ayal, supra note, at 121. For discussion of
the anticompetitive implications of product differentiation in US healthcare markets, see
Sage & Hammer, supra note, at 1073, 1082.
94
Stearns, supra note, at 257.
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Here again we see the two necessary, but not sufficient, conditions, but
again with a twist. First consumers act with incomplete knowledge
regarding the product’s overall quality. But this is a caused in part by
consumer preference in having more choices. Consumers might feel regret
if they purchase a simpler product with fewer attributes—believing that
they will need the attributes far more than they actually will.95 Naïve
consumers may overestimate the quality benefits of particular attributes,
thereby skewing supply to products with one great feature but lower overall
quality—to the detriment of sophisticated purchasers.96
Second, in these markets, firms cannot attain a competitive advantage
by simplifying the choice architecture. One reason, as discussed with
behavioral exploitation, is that may be more profitable to increase
complexity and thereby soften competition. Another reason is that firm in
some industries may face a collective action problem.97
95

OFT Report, supra note, at § 2.9.
OFT Report, supra note, at § 3.129-3.130 (discussing a model where the firm can use
“single-attribute   advertising   which   only   highlights   one   attribute   of   the   product   to  
manipulate   the   way  consumers  value  the  product.  In  particular,  naïve  consumers   who  are  
not knowledgeable enough will thus overvalue the importance of the advertised attribute
but undervalue the importance of the unadvertised one.” As a result, “the  product  designed  
for   naïve   consumers   has   a   too   high   quality   in   the   advertised   dimension   and   a   too   low  
quality in the unadvertised  dimension,   while  that  designed  for  sophisticated  consumers   is  
distorted  in  the  opposite  way.  The  outcome  is  that  naïve  consumers  will  end  up  consuming  
a product that scores extremely well on an attribute but has a mediocre overall
performance, while  sophisticated  consumers  cannot  find  the  product  they  most  want,  which  
reflects  the  negative  externality  imposed  by  the  presence  of  naïve  consumers.”).
97
Suppose, as   some   studies   find,   that   a   supermarket’s   product   assortment   “positively  
relates to consumers’   perceptions   of   the   value   of   the   store   as   a   whole”   and   store  
satisfaction. Ian Clarke et al., Consumer Satisfaction with Local Retail Diversity in the UK:
Effects of Supermarket Access, Brand Variety, and Social Deprivation, 44 ENVIRONMENT
& PLANNING A 1896, 1897, 1899 (2012). Consumers value having a greater variety, like
the 550 varieties of television sets one US retailer offers online and hundreds offered in
some stores, and perceive them to be of higher quality. But suppose television
manufacturers and retailers recognize that offering so many varieties of television sets,
while attracting consumers to their websites and stores, also increases the likelihood of
choice overload and regret. Claudia Townsend & Barbara Kahn, “The Visual Preference
Heuristic”:   The   Influence   of   Visual   Versus   Verbal   Depiction   on   Assortment   Processing,  
Perceived Variety, and Choice Overload, 40 JOURNAL OF CONSUMER RESEARCH 993
(2014). Suppose the TV manufacturers and retailers recognize that if they offered fewer
TV sets, sales and profits would likely increase without adversely affecting consumer
welfare. Spassova & Isen, supra note, at 397 (noting that “managers often find that the
better part of their sales is accounted for only a small fraction of the offerings in their
portfolio,” but many firms pursue a strategy of product proliferation to satisfy a wide range
of consumer tastes, deter entry, be perceived as being higher quality, and keep customers
from switching to competitors). No retailer would want to unilaterally limit its assortment
96
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THE UNIQUE CASE OF QUALITY DEGRADATION BY PRODUCERS

Part III considers how firms will under-invest in quality, despite the
presence of competitive pressure, due to communications imperfections and
consumer biases.
This Part pushes further to consider unique circumstances where faced
with intense competition and downward pressure on price, sellers will
actively erode their products’   quality. This sub-group is fascinating. The
positive correlation between competition and quality not only breaks down,
but gives way to negative correlation and clear welfare loss.
A. Conditions and Outcomes
A producer may choose unilaterally to degrade quality as this may be
the least resistant path to successfully absorb the pressures of fierce
competition. Not surprisingly, such phenomenon is limited to where the
product characteristics enable producers to disguise their reducing the
product’s  quality and consumers do not detect the quality erosion. This may
be the case with complex products and components and when customers
lack clear parameters for assessing quality or the requisite knowledge or
sophistication.
Evidently, quality erosion creates a business risk for the producer or
service provider. One would therefore expect quality erosion when
consumers are locked in, where producers can externalize the risk, or
alternatively, as a last resort—when no other legitimate actions enable the
company to remain in the market.

to 10 TV sets, when it risks devaluing its image relative to its competitors. Thus, each firm
might want to limit the number of TV sets, but not if it would reduce foot traffic and sales
of other products. So retailers offer more choices than optimal, to avoid being at a
competitive disadvantage to competitors. If the competitors, to resolve the collective
action problem, agreed to limit the selection of TV sets, they likely would exercise market
power in significantly changing the mix of the variety that would otherwise arise from
competition. Accordingly, if one key policy objective “is to insure that the freedom of
choice of consumers of goods and services is not restricted by conduct that is
anticompetitive,”  then  the  retailers  would  be  liable.  Blue Cross of Washington & Alaska v.
Kitsap Physicians Serv., C81-918V, 1981 WL 2198 (W.D. Wash. Oct. 28, 1981).
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To illustrate, imagine a competitive upstream production market, which
supplies a concentrated midstream market with buyer power. Such market
conditions often result in downward pressure on price, to the benefit of
consumers. Indeed, outside the monopsony model, where both   the   seller’s  
price and quality of its products can be depressed,98 it is assumed that the
powerful buyers will pass part of the cost benefit to consumers.
Now, consider the following scenario while focusing on the quality
variant. Imagine an upstream producer of private label pasta sauce which
deals with a leading supermarket chain. The powerful buyer wants to lower
its retail prices, and thereby seeks a cost reduction for its pasta sauce. The
pasta sauce producer needs to be in the leading supermarket chain.
Accordingly the pasta sauce producer lowers its bid for the subsequent year.
This enables it to win the contract for an additional year against fierce
horizontal competition from the other sauce producers. Having won the
contract, and faced with a fixed price, the pasta sauce producer remains
exposed to market changes, for example increases in the price of raw
materials, e.g., tomatoes, labor, etc. To the extent possible, the private label
supplier’s   point   of   least   resistance—when face with costs fluctuations—is
quality.
To the extent that the sophisticated supermarket and its customers are
unable to detect changes to the product’s   quality and   ‘punish’   the   private
label pasta producer—quality can gradually erode. Importantly, that
process takes place alongside visible price reductions, perceived welfare
gain and healthy and efficient competition. Granted some consumers may
place a greater emphasis on lower prices than higher quality. But note that
even they pay more than what they would have, had they known about the
98

W. Penn Allegheny Health Sys., Inc. v. UPMC, 627 F.3d 85, 104 (3d Cir. 2010) (noting
that monopsony in depressing reimbursement rates “tends to diminish the quality and
availability of hospital services”); accord Warren S. Grimes, The Sherman Act’s
Unintended Bias Against Lilliputians: Small Players’ Collective Action as a Counter to
Relational Market Power, 69 ANTITRUST L.J. 195, 210 (2001) (“The very nature of
monopsony or oligopsony power is that it tends to suppress output and reduce quality or
choice.”); Press Release, U.S. DOJ, Blue Cross Blue Shield of Michigan and Physicians
Health Plan of Mid-Michigan Abandon Merger Plans 1 (Mar. 8, 2010), available at
http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/press_ releases/2010/256259.pdf (alleging that Blue Care
Networks of Michigan’s plan to acquire Physicians Health Plan of Mid-Michigan “would
have given Blue Cross-Michigan the ability to control physician reimbursement rates in a
manner that could harm the quality of health care delivered to consumers”).
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inferior quality. In other words, the customer receives less than what they
bargained for.
In addition, quality erosion may lead to a competitive race to the
bottom. The price achieved through quality erosion is often below optimal
levels and forces other, as efficient, sellers to lower their bids below
prevailing cost levels and engage in similar practices. Absent adequate
regulation, consumer awareness or quality control, the outcome may be
detrimental. This race-to-the bottom is not limited solely to product quality.
Producers may further externalize costs by degrading labor and
environmental safety practices.99
In addition to unilateral quality degradation, one should also note the
possibility for collusive quality degradation. Here, competitors agree to
limit quality competition. As the Ukrainian competition authority observed:
[G]iven a high degree of market transparency and a highly competitive
market, the manufacturers tend to use parallel decrease of product quality
as a way of decreasing their costs, thereby increasing their
competitiveness. If direct evidence that a parallel decrease of quality is
the result of business entities’ concerted actions is available, competition
authorities have to react. In other cases of a parallel reduction of quality
in competitive markets it is more appropriate, in our view, to use of tools
of technical regulation.100

When powerful buyers depress prices to levels that undermine the
99

The downward pressure on the sellers’ price increases the risks of negative externalities.
To reduce their costs, more farmers, for example, dispense waste without the necessary
precautions. See OLIVIER DE SCHUTTER, BRIEFING NOTE 3, ADDRESSING CONCENTRATION
IN FOOD SUPPLY CHAINS: THE ROLE OF COMPETITION LAW IN TACKLING THE ABUSE OF
BUYER POWER 2 (2010). Sustainability and environmental concerns of increased soil
erosion, reduced biodiversity, deforestation, and water, soil, and air pollution arise. See
Duncan Green, Oxfam, Conspiracy of Silence: Old and New Directions on Commodities
(June 2005) (unpublished manuscript at tbl.2), available at http:// policypractice.oxfam.org.uk/publications/conspiracy-of-silence-old-and-new-directions-oncommodities-1125 54; see also Nicolas Petit, Ethiopia’s Coffee Sector: A Bitter or Better
Future?, 7 J. AGRARIAN CHANGE 225, 253 (2007); Declaration of the European Parliament
on Investigating and Remedying Abuse of Power by Large Supermarkets Operating in the
European
Union,
Eur.
Parliament
(Feb.
19,
2008),
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?reference=P6_TA%282008%
290054&language=EN (declaring that powerful retailers’ buyer power has “negative
knock-on effects on both quality of employment and environmental protection”).
100
OECD Quality Report, supra note, at 116 (Ukraine).
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producer’s   present or future profitability and business viability, quality
erosion, although risky, provides a way out. The best route to restore
profitability may be to reduce surreptitiously   the   product’s   quality   or  
otherwise externalize costs (such as polluting). Accordingly, as the
powerful buyer reduces  its  supplier’s  price, the supplier -- to retain profits at
its pre-discount levels -- will reduce quality further.101 Interestingly,
competition pushes the producer to focus on short term gain; under this
competitive pressure, the producer does not have the benefit of longevity to
consider long term outcomes which may well be relevant in repeated
interaction with buyers and consumers.
One competition authority stated that if   the   product   is   “purchased  
infrequently, a firm may be better able to decrease quality, particularly if
product quality is also difficult to discern prior to purchase.”102 But the
opposite is also true. A firm may be better able to decrease quality
incrementally if the product is purchased frequently, as the taste of tomato
sauce is degraded slightly each month. Whichever is true for that industry,
this quality degradation occurs when consumers cannot detect and respond
to the quality erosion.
This problem of quality degradation, of course, can arise under
oligopolies or monopolies. But a monopoly will offer quality innovations
when it provides additional profits (or helps maintain its monopoly). The
monopoly is likelier to recapture its investment in informing consumers of
the quality benefits.
Both categories illustrate how at times, the correlation between quality
and competition is imperfect. At times, competitive pressure, even intense
pressure, will reduce, rather than safeguard, consumer welfare.
This phenomenon may be more common in daily life than one would
expect. We illustrate its manifestation in three distinct areas.

101

A Ezrachi & K De Jong, Buyer Power, Private Labels and the Welfare Consequences of
Quality Erosion, 33 ECLR 257, 258-259 (2012).
102
OECD Quality Report, supra note, at 62 (Canada).
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B. Private Labels
The production of private (own) labels may provide opportunities for
quality erosion where the buyer lacks the sophistication to identify quality
degradation. As the private label producer does not own the brand, it is
often less exposed to the risks of quality erosion.103 Such erosion may
affect the quality of food products, personal care products, cleaning
products and more.104
Take for example reports in Europe concerning the budget private label
“Euro   Shopper”—used by a few major European retailers. Some of Euro
Shopper’s sauces and products were found to contain water as the main
ingredient, leading to the retailers terminating their supply agreements.105
Similarly, in the UK, three of the larger retailers withdrew from their
shelves fish products sold under their own label which were found to be
adulterated.106 Beef and chicken product were also subjected to similar
practices.107 A similar practice of adding water to fish products was exposed
in Germany, leading to a removal of the Edka private label King Prawns
from shelves.108 These are not isolated cases.109 Other practices may
concern the chemical composition and active ingredients in detergents and

103

It is important to stress that we do not suggest that quality erosion is a characteristic of
private label production, but the following examples are illustrative of the potential for
such erosion. In fact they concern instances in which an attempt to erode quality was
eventually exposed.
104
Ezrachi & De Jong, supra note, at 258–259.
105
Koen   De   Jong,   ‘Too   Lidl   Too   Late’   (2013)   29   Food   Personality;;   See   also  
<http://www.volkskrant.nl/vk/nl/2664/Nieuws/article/detail/3423361/2013/04/10/AHhaalt-budgetlijn-Euro-Shopper-uit-schappen.dhtml>.
106
‘Three  UK  Retailers  Nix  Pangasius’  Seafood  International  (September  2011)  19
107
See ---,   ‘Water-injected   meat:   the   UK’s   latest   food   scandal?’   (19   July   2004)  
http://www.foodproductiondaily.com/Supply-Chain/Water-injected-meat-the-UK-s-latestfood-scandal.   ;;   F   Lawrence,   ‘Scandal   of   beef   waste   in   chicken’   (The   Guardian,   21   May  
2003) <http://www.theguardian.com/society/2003/may/21/food.foodanddrink>
108
See <http://www.hannover-zeitung.net/aktuell/vermischtes/47214382-fisch-skandalsupermaerkte-machen-fische-mit-zusatzstoffen-schwerer-edeka-nimmt-erstes-produkt-ausdem-handel>;
http://www.fischmagazin.de/newsartikel-seriennummer-2618Markt+am+Montag+thematisiert+zusaetzliches+Wasser+im+Fisch.htm;
<http://www.news.at/a/lebensmittelskandal-gepanschter-fisch-supermarkt>.
109
Stearns, supra note, at 247 (discussing why “it is precisely the lack of (cr)edibility in the
market—i.e., the absence of reliable quality signals, the lack of traceability, the high degree
of anonymity, and the destruction of trust—that creates the structural impediments and
powerful disincentive for improving the edibility of food”).
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care products.110
Externalities may also be found in products having long supply chains
that detach the source of the product from the end consumer. Illustrative is
the horsemeat scandal which dominated the media in Europe in 2013.
Following investigation by the Irish Food Standards Agency, many
prepared meals across the EU were found to contain horse meat despite
their packaging, which advertised the meat as 100% beef.111 Likewise,
McDonald’s sales in Asia dropped after the discovery of its supplier was
accused of repackaging old meat as new.112 These scandals highlight the
complexity of distribution channels and their susceptibility to fraud.113
Interestingly, fraudulent labeling may also occur at the retailer level. In
Sweden, for example, a conspiracy to repackage of out-of-date meat was
exposed and led to a criminal investigation into four stores in the Swedish
ICA supermarket chain.114
C. Locked in Customers – Care Homes and Hospitals
Quality erosion can also occur when the customer is locked in with no
outside option and is not the one choosing the provider or paying for its
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services.115 Some areas of public procurement exhibit these characteristics.
In these instances it is indeed interesting to ask whether focusing primarily
on price and cost truly delivers greater value or in fact results in lower
value, albeit unquantifiable, as quality is eroded.
Take for example the provision of care homes in the UK. Their quality
erosion made the headlines in 2011. Interestingly, the quality erosion was
reported by the provider and tacitly accepted by the buyer—the National
Health Service (NHS). Arguably, the NHS did not fully internalize the cost
of the erosion and was incentivized to increase pressure on price on account
of the patients.116 In that instance a large number of care homes, which
provided services for the NHS, argued that the NHS had been
systematically reducing its payments, thereby undermining the quality of
service. They argued that the NHS used “its dominant purchasing power in
a way that involved ‘coercion not competition and is giving precedence to
price over other necessary considerations,’ which included the cost of
providing care and the impact on patients.”117
More generally, with respect to the health sector, it is interesting to note
that generally, a positive correlation exists between competition and quality
of the services.118 However, some studies suggest that “market competition
might be a blunt instrument and it may not be the most suitable policy tool
to drive hospital quality-improvement effects.”119
115
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D. Airlines

Interestingly, quality erosion may also be detected in well-regulated
industries. Here such degradation of service and quality may exist within
the margins allowed for by the relevant regulation. It may allow the
provider to offer attractive prices, while reducing less transparent areas of
service.
The proliferation of budget airlines has increased the pressure on
airlines to provide services at lower costs. Some of the price reductions are
accompanied with transparent changes to quality of service. Others,
however, may involve disguised variants. Indeed, intense competition may
induce   airlines   to   exploit   consumers’   behavioural   biases,   involving less
salient factors of quality.
Take for example the possible impact on safety and air delays.
According to figures published by the Civil Aviation Authority, pilots had
to make 28 emergency landings because of fuel shortages at British airports
between 2010 and 2012. In addition, 224 aircrafts flying into British
airports or operated by UK-based airlines have reported low fuel incidents
over the past four years despite the strict rules regulating the fuel intake
within the EU.120 Reportedly, pilots can be under pressure from airlines in
light  of  the  industry’s  needs  to  minimise  costs.121 As reported by one pilot:
"I’m   constantly   under   pressure   to   carry   less   fuel   than   I’m   comfortable  
with… Sometimes if you carry just enough fuel and you hit thunderstorms
or delays, then  suddenly  you’re  running  out  of  gas  and  you  have  to  go  to  an  
alternate airport.”122 According to the regulatory framework, airlines should
821 (2011).
120
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not be allowed to take off without enough fuel to reach their destination and
without accounting for alternative airports in their flight plan together with
an additional 30 minutes flying and a final approach before landing.123
Usually, low fuel incidents take place in the event of bad weather, where
fights are inclined to spend more time in the air than originally planned.124
Apart from the above-mentioned instances of low fuel emergency
landings, the airline sector provides further examples of possible quality
erosion. Intense  competition  in  the  airline  sector  drove  Qantas’  decision  to  
open a new operator in Asia, where the associated costs are much lower.
This decision would amount to 1,000 job cuts and the Transport Workers
Union alleged that it would result in a rapid decline in standards, though
Qantas rebutted this allegation. Irrespective of the actual truth of statements
of this sort, the fact remains that the decision was driven by excess
competition and could possibly result in a lowering of operating
standards.125
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123
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Another illustrative example concerns air-quality in airplanes.126 Other,
less sensitive areas in which quality erosion may be detected concern the
airlines’ practice of unbundling the charges for checked bags in airline
travel,127 changes to flight schedule, carry-on baggage policies, leg room,
quality of onboard meal and drink service, quality of frequent flyer
programs and other ancillary services.128
CONCLUSION
No one disagrees that quality is a fundamental aspect of competition.
As we point out, quality will be especially important in two-sided markets
where a product or service is offered for free. Nor do we fundamentally
disagree with two heuristics upon which the competition authorities rely.
We accept that at times quality and competition are positively correlated,
i.e., more competition will generally increase quality for a given price or
reduce price for a given level of quality. We also accept that when prices
and quality vary, consumers at times will weigh the offerings using an
internal price-quality metric.
We aim here to identify several scenarios where these heuristics break
down, when competition and quality are not positively correlated, and when
an increase in competition can actually reduce consumer welfare. We also
aim to identify two necessary, but not sufficient, conditions, that are
common to all of these scenarios. The first relates to the consumers’
limited ability to accurately assess quality differences. This may be
http://wayback.archive.org/web/20110820043211/http:/www.abc.net.au/news/2011-0816/unions-slam-qantas-over-job-cuts/2841954.
126
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July
16,
2009,
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970204261704574275980659583434.html?m
od=WSJ_article_comments#articleTabs%3Darticle. In the US, experts have undertaken
studies and concluded that the air quality is overall satisfactory but there is room for
improvement. In the same vein, flight attendant unions have expressed concerns about
illnesses that may have resulted from poor air quality exposure aboard airplanes. Therefore,
the unions had been pushing for a tougher air-circulation requirement, but were overall
pleased with the findings of the report.
127
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105 (2012).
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attributable to external factors (such as deceptive claims) or dispositional
factors (such as consumer biases or imperfect willpower). The second
concerns imperfect information flows that make it difficult or costly to
convey to consumers the products’ or services’ inherent quality differences.
Companies recognize that neither they nor their competitors can easily or
inexpensively convey to consumers the inherent quality differences in their
and  their  competitors’ product offerings. With these two conditions in mind,
we provided instances when an increase in competition will not increase
quality (when one would expect it should) and when competition is
inversely correlated with quality, and its increase would lead to quality
degradation.
A sophisticated company is likely to identify instances in which quality
forms the point of least resistance. We note that in a repeated game one
would assume a cost and risk which the producer will attribute when
engaging in limited or underinvestment in quality. We show, however, that
under certain market conditions, the rational and profit maximizing strategy
would involve quality manipulation, despite competitive pressure. In other
instances, it is the alternative cost of being forced out of the market which
may lead an undertaking to engage in quality manipulation.
So should competition authorities continue to rely on their two
heuristics? Yes, but very cautiously in markets characterized by the two
conditions we identify. If they apply their heuristics uncritically in these
markets, there is a greater risk that they will reach the wrong conclusion or
fail to appreciate the degradation in quality.
This paper lays out the risk. More inquiry is required on the additional
steps the competition authorities can and should take in these markets.
Granted competition authorities will at times have difficulties in directly
assessing and measuring quality. Other policy constraints may also cause
the agencies to rely on their two heuristics. But the competition agency
must carefully consider the possibility for negative or no correlation
between competitive pressure and quality. In those instances, when
possible, the competition authority must try to measure more directly the
challenged  merger’s  or  restraint’s  impact on quality.
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Another implication of our analysis concerns the benefit of competition.
First, we provide instances where competition fails to improve quality and
consumer welfare, when one ordinarily assumes it should. Second, we note
that more competition is not always the elixir in imperfect markets. For
example, new entry may increase, rather than ameliorate, firms’ exploiting
consumer bias and information asymmetries.129
So what is the alternative? These limitations of the competitive process
and of ex-post competition enforcement draw attention to other enforcement
mechanisms. One alternative involves ex-ante enforcement, in the form of
sector inquiries and market studies aimed at identifying market failures.
Such measures may result in monitoring tools, discussion forums, and
industry codes.130 Another approach involves industry regulation designed
with   the   producers’   incentive   and   disincentives   in   mind. The regulatory
aim here is to prevent a competitive race to the bottom and its attendant
health and safety risks. Regulation may target informational asymmetries
or focus on the supply of goods and service.
We do not attempt to explore these enforcement avenues in this paper.
Rather  we  simply  want  to  show  that  you  don’t  always  get  what  you  pay  for,  
even when competition is fierce.
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